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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the anonymous proposer vector consensus problem in which a
set of processes decide on a vector of values, where each value is a proposal made anonymously
by a single process. In a distributed survey, for example, a solution to anonymous proposer
vector consensus allows non-faulty processes to put forward a potentially controversial opinion
that is not tied to their identity. More specifically, a non-faulty process’ proposal is indistin-
guishable from that of all non-faulty processes, even in the presence of timing attacks. We
also define the anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast problem which ensures the properties of
reliable broadcast [11] hold with the same anonymity guarantee. For each problem, we present
a protocol that solves it in presence of Byzantine faults. Solving anonymous all-to-all reliable
broadcast, Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP) executes in two regu-
lar and one anonymous message delays with the same message complexity as n invocations of
Bracha’s reliable broadcast protocol [9]. Solving anonymous proposer vector consensus, Anony-
mous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP) is a reduction to binary consensus which
can terminate in three regular and one anonymous message delay.
1 Introduction
The vector consensus problem [4,25,45] involves identified processes deciding on a vector of values,
each of which was proposed by one process. By contrast to interactive consistency [39], a proto-
col solving vector consensus need not assume synchrony. Consider a distributed survey, where a
group of mutually distrusting processes wish to exchange opinions about a given issue. With vec-
tor consensus alone, processes are inextricably tied to their opinion. When this is undesirable—in
whistle-blowing and electronic voting, for example—it is of interest to allow processes to anony-
mously propose their value. Importantly, using vector consensus for an election allows the contents
of a proposal (vote) to be arbitrary. In voting for a leader, say, if the pool of candidates is suffi-
ciently large—a population, say—the viable decentralised alternative, homomorphic tallying [2,21],
becomes infeasible, as votes must be encoded as values that can be meaningfully summed prior to
decryption.
Motivated by this, we define the anonymous proposer vector consensus problem, which ex-
tends vector consensus by asserting that all non-faulty processes cannot be associated with their
proposal with probability greater than random guessing. We define anonymous all-to-all reliable
broadcast analogously with respect to reliable broadcast [11]. Our primary contribution, Anony-
mous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP), relies on a solution to anonymous all-to-all
reliable broadcast, Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP). Both protocols
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are correct in the presence of Byzantine faults. We also show that by composing AVCP and thresh-
old encryption [22, 53], the contents of all non-faulty processes’ proposals can remain hidden until
after AVCP terminates, which enables a form of electronic voting. In contexts where individual
proposals (votes) can be eventually made public, this privacy guarantee can suffice. One promising
application is in a replicated state machine with an appropriate mechanism for reconfiguration [38],
such as a consortium blockchain [57], for governing the addition and removal of decider processes.
To achieve anonymity, we combine traceable ring signatures [29], which enable processes to
anonymously prove their membership in a set of processes, and anonymous communication channels.
Critically, the signatures expose a signer’s identity if and only if they sign two different messages,
ensuring a process can only propose a single value to the consensus. Particularly because our
protocols rely on both anonymous and regular channels, latency [3] and message transmission
ordering [48] can diminish the anonymity provided by the anonymous channels themselves. To cope,
we assume non-faulty processes anonymously broadcast their message after any previous instance
of AVCP terminates, and that every process delivers these messages in a random order. To cope,
we assume that processes anonymously broadcast in a window of synchrony and that messages that
are anonymously sent are delivered to processes in a random order. These measures ensure that,
in the view of the adversary, each message received by a process under their control could have
been sent by any non-faulty process. The synchrony assumption can also allow more than n − t
proposals to be decided in vector consensus, which is useful in electronic voting. For efficiency and
to reduce the impact of correlation-based attacks [42] in practice, processes anonymously broadcast
once in a given protocol execution.
AVCP is an efficient reduction to a partially-synchronous binary consensus protocol [20], possi-
bly terminating after three regular and one anonymous message delays. AARBP terminates after
two regular and one anonymous message delays in general and has identical message complexity to
n instances of Bracha’s seminal reliable broadcast protocol [9]. In constructing AVCP, we demon-
strate that AARBP can be used as a primitive in other protocols. Our experimental results are
promising—with 100 geo-distributed nodes, AVCP generally terminated in less than ten seconds.
Related work. A protocol that solves the anonymous consensus problem [33] involves a set
of processes without identifiers reaching consensus. Anonymous consensus protocols tolerating
crash failures under asynchrony [8] and tolerating Byzantine failures under synchrony [46] have
been proposed. Our goal is different in that processes with identifiers aim at reaching consensus
by proposing their value anonymously. Anonymous channels can be instantiated using publicly-
deployed [24, 59] networks, which have varying guarantees [30, 44]. In-house solutions that do not
require additional processes [18,32] and that are robust [31,37] can also be used.
Consensus protocols, including AVCP (and excluding failure detector-based solutions [4]), can
be constructed to accept proposals satisfying some notion of validity even if proposed by Byzantine
processes [13, 20]. For example, a Byzantine process may propose a well-formed ballot in a de-
centralised electronic election. We have avoided leader-based protocol design [16] due to expensive
view-change and the ability for a leader to support and exclude proposals with great freedom. Ran-
domisation [14, 43, 47] could be used to avoid the reliance on the weak coordinator in DBFT [20],
although ensues cryptographic overhead. A limited number of protocols solving vector consensus in
the literature have been proposed, including those involving failure detectors [4,25], wormholes [45]
and explicit partial synchrony [19]. A reduction to binary consensus has been used in solving similar
problems to vector consensus [6, 20,23].
To ensure both anonymity and that processes only propose one value, linkable ring signa-
tures [40], which can be more efficient in size [55] and computational effort [41] than traceable ring
signatures, can be used, although traceability ensures that Byzantine processes are held account-
able when double-signing. Systems that ensure anonymity amongst a distributed set of users that
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rely on blind signatures [17] can be constructed [15], but, unlike our protocols, rely on a trusted au-
thority beyond the initial setup. Relevant cryptocurrencies that preserve the privacy of individual
transactions, rather than that of consensus participants, include Monero [54] and Zcash [36].
Roadmap. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides preliminary definitions
and establishes the system model for our protocols. Section 3 explores anonymous all-to-all re-
liable broadcast and presents AARBP. Section 4 explores anonymous proposer vector consensus
and presents AVCP. For simplicity, we present AARBP and AVCP in Sections 3 and 4 without
considering anonymity in the presence of timing attacks, which we consider in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes and proposes directions for future research. Appendices A, B and C contain
the correctness proof of AARBP, a description of the binary consensus algorithm which AVCP
relies on [20], and the correctness proof of AVCP, respectively. Appendix D combines AVCP and
threshold encryption and characterises the resulting voting scheme. Appendix E provides empirical
evaluations of our protocols on up to 100 nodes distributed on three continents.
2 Model and preliminaries
We assume the existence of a set of processes P = {p1, . . . , pn} (where |P | = n, and the ith process
is pi), an adversary A who corrupts up to t <
n
3 processes in P , and a trusted dealer D. We work
in the authenticated model, where cryptographic primitives are unbreakable by assumption. With
concrete primitives, each party could be modelled as being able to execute a number of instructions
bounded by a polynomial in a security parameter k.
Network: We assume that P consists of asynchronous, sequential processes that communicate
over reliable, point-to-point channels in an asynchronous network. An asynchronous process is
one that executes instructions at its own pace. We note that sequential processes may multiplex
instruction execution. An asynchronous network is one where message delays are unbounded. A
reliable network is such that any message sent will eventually be delivered by the intended recipient.
We assume that processes can also communicate using one-way anonymous channels. In these, the
identity of the sending process, who may not even be a member of P , is unknown to the recipient.
Since consensus is impossible in the general case in failure-prone asynchronous message-passing
systems [27], we assume partial synchrony holds among processes in P to reach consensus in Sec-
tion 4. That is, we assume there exists a point in time in protocol execution, the global stabilisation
time (GST), after which all message transfer delays are upper bounded by an (unknown) finite con-
stant [26]. To mitigate de-anonymisation attacks based on message delivery timing, we require both
an additional synchrony assumption and an assumption on the order of anonymous message delivery
being random. Both assumptions, and the motivation behind them, are described in Section 5.
Each process is equipped with the primitive “sendm to pj”, which sends the message m (possibly
a tuple) to process pj ∈ P . For simplicity, we assume that pj can send a message to itself. A process
receives a message by invoking the primitive “receive()”. Each process may invoke “broadcast m”,
which is short-hand for “for each pi ∈ P do send m to pi end for”. Analogously, processes may
invoke “anon send m to pj” and “anon broadcast m”, which refers to the sending and broadcast
of message m, respectively, over anonymous channels. A process receives a message sent via a
“anon send” call by invoking the primitive “anon receive()”.
Adversary: We assume that the adversary A schedules message delivery over the reliable
channels. For each send call made, A determines when the corresponding receive call is invoked. A
portion of processes—up to t members of P—may be initially corrupted by A and therefore exhibit
Byzantine faults [39] over the lifetime of a protocol’s execution. That is, they may deviate from the
predefined protocol in an arbitrary way. We assume A can see all computations and messages sent
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and received by corrupted processes. We assume processes can only be corrupted by the adversary.
A non-faulty process is one that is not corrupted by A and therefore follows the prescribed protocol.
A cannot observe anon send and anon receive calls made by non-faulty processes. A cannot see the
(local) computations that non-faulty processes perform.
Trusted setup: We assume an initial trusted setup, in which the trusted dealer, D, generates
the initial state for P . In practice, D generates keying material for cryptographic primitives.
Performance: For protocol analysis, we consider message complexity, the number of messages
sent by non-faulty processes, and communication complexity or bit complexity, the number of bits
transferred. We consider worst-case complexity as well as fault-free complexity, which is defined as
the complexity when no process acts faulty.
Traceable ring signatures. Informally, a ring signature [29, 50] allows a process to produce a
signature that verifies its membership with respect to an ad-hoc set of public keys without revealing
its identity. Variant schemes with weakened anonymity levels [29, 40] allows two messages signed
by the same process to be linked or traced together. While linking does not reveal the signer’s
identity, tracing does.
Hereafter, we consider traceable ring signatures (or TRSs), which are ring signatures that pro-
vide a traceability guarantee. To increase flexibility, we can consider traceability with respect
to a particular string called an issue. Issue-dependent traceability [56] allows signers to maintain
anonymity if they sign multiple messages, provided each message is signed with respect to a different
issue. Our definitions are analogous to those of Fujisaki and Suzuki [29].
Let ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, which we denote as a tag. With respect to these definitions, we assume
that all processes may query an idealised distributed oracle, which implements the following four
operations:
1. σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m), which takes the integer i ∈ {1..n}, tag ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and message m ∈
{0, 1}∗, and outputs the signature σ ∈ {0, 1}∗. We restrict Sign such that only process pi ∈ P
may invoke Sign with first argument i.
2. b ← VerifySig(ID ,m, σ), which takes the tag ID , message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and signature σ ∈
{0, 1}∗, and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. All processes may query VerifySig.
3. out← Trace(ID ,m, σ,m′, σ′), which takes the tag ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, messages m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
signatures σ, σ′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs out ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {1, . . . , n} (possibly corresponding to a
process pi). All processes may query Trace.
4. x ← FindIndex(ID ,m, σ) takes a tag ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, and a signature
σ ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs a value x ∈ {1, . . . , n}. FindIndex may not be called by any party, and
exists only for protocol definitions.
We describe the behaviour of the idealised distributed oracle:
• Signature correctness and unforgeability: VerifySig(ID ,m, σ) = 1 ⇐⇒ there exists some
process pi ∈ P that previously invoked Sign(i, ID ,m) and obtained σ as a response. Unforgeabil-
ity is captured by the “⇒” claim.
• Traceability and entrapment-freeness: The function Trace behaves as defined below ⇐⇒
σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m) and σ′ ← Sign(i′, ID ,m′):
Trace(ID ,m, σ,m′, σ′) =

“indep” if i 6= i′,
“linked” else if m = m′,
i otherwise (i = i′ ∧m 6= m′).
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Traceability is captured by the “⇐” claim: if m = m′, then the messages are linked, otherwise,
the identity of the signing process pi = pi′ is exposed. Entrapment-freeness is captured by the
“⇒” claim: loosely, processes cannot be falsely accused of double-signing.
• Signature anonymity: Suppose σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m), where pi ∈ P is non-faulty. Then, it is
impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability greater than 1n−t .
With respect to FindIndex(ID ,m, σ), x ∈ {1..n} is output if and only if σ is the result of process px
having previously queried Sign(x, ID ,m). The unforgeability property implies signature uniqueness:
If calls σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m) and σ′ ← Sign(j, ID ,m′) are made, then σ 6= σ′. The concrete scheme
proposed by Fujisaki and Suzuki [29] satisfies these properties in the random oracle model [5]
provided the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable. It has signatures of size O(kn),
where k is the security parameter. To simplify the presentation, we assume that its properties hold
unconditionally in the following. In implementation, Fujisaki and Suzuki’s scheme [29] requires
ID = issue || pk1 || · · · || pkn, where pki denotes the ith process’ public key, and issue is a string.
3 Anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast
To reach eventual agreement in the presence of Byzantine processes without revealing who pro-
poses what, we introduce the anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast problem that preserves the
anonymity of each honest sender reliably broadcasting. In this primitive, all processes are assumed
to (anonymously) broadcast a message, and all processes receive a set of messages. It ensures that
all honest processes always receive the same message from one specific sender while hiding the
identity of any non-faulty sender. To solve this problem when t < n3 , we propose the Anonymous
All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP) that combines (i) Bracha’s reliable broadcast pro-
tocol [9] to guarantee that non-faulty processes eventually receive the same messages, (ii) Fujisaki
and Suzuki’s traceable ring signature scheme [29] to hold processes accountable if they attempt to
propose twice and (iii) a regular broadcast via anonymous channels. We analyse its complexity
and discuss some optimisations, but defer the analysis to Appendix A.
Let m be a message, and σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m) a signature, where the identifier ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ identi-
fies a given instance of AARB-broadcast. Each process is equipped with two operations, “AARBP”
and “AARB-deliver”. AARBP[ID ](m) is invoked once with respect to ID , denoting the beginning
of a process’ execution of AARBP with respect to ID . AARB-deliver[ID](m,σ) is invoked between
n− t and n times throughout protocol execution. When a process invokes AARB-deliver[ID ](m,σ),
they are said to “AARB-deliver” (m,σ) with respect to ID .
Then, given t < n3 , we define a protocol that implements anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast
(AARB-broadcast) with respect to an identifier ID that uniquely defines an instance of AARB-
broadcast as satisfying the following six properties:
1. AARB-Signing: If a non-faulty process pi AARB-delivers a message, then it must be of the
form (m,σ), where a process pi ∈ P invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m).
2. AARB-Validity: Suppose that a non-faulty process AARB-delivers (m,σ). Let i =
FindIndex(ID ,m, σ) denote the output of an idealised call to FindIndex. Then if pi is non-faulty,
pi must have anonymously broadcast (m,σ).
3. AARB-Unicity: Consider any point of time in which a non-faulty process p has AARB-
delivered more than one tuple. Let delivered = {(m1, σ1), · · · , (mk, σk)}, where |delivered| = k,
denote the set of these tuples. For each i ∈ {1..k}, let outi = FindIndex(ID ,mi, σi) denote the
output of an idealised call to FindIndex. Then for all distinct pairs of tuples {(mi, σi), (mj , σj)},
outi 6= outj .
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4. AARB-Termination-1: If a process pi is non-faulty and invokes AARBP[ID](m), all the
non-faulty processes eventually AARB-deliver (m,σ), where σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m).
5. ARB-Termination-2: If a non-faulty process AARB-delivers (m,σ), then all the non-faulty
processes eventually AARB-deliver (m,σ).
We require AARB-Signing to ensure that the other properties are meaningful. Since messages
are anonymously broadcast, properties refer to the index of the signing process determined by an
idealised call to FindIndex. In spirit, AARB-Validity ensures if a non-faulty process AARB-delivers
a message that was signed by a non-faulty process pi, then pi must have invoked AARBP. Similarly,
AARB-Unicity ensures that a non-faulty process will AARB-deliver at most one message signed by
each process. We note that AARB-Termination-2 is critical for consensus, as without it, different
processes may AARB-deliver different messages produced by the same process, as in the two-step
algorithm implementing no-duplicity broadcast [10,49]. Finally, we state the anonymity property:
6. AARB-Anonymity: Let (m,σ) be a tuple anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process
pi. Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability Pr >
1
n−t .
Informally, AARB-Anonymity guarantees that the source of an anonymously broadcast message
by a non-faulty process is unknown to the adversary, in that it is indistinguishable from n − t
(non-faulty) processes.
State and messages. Each process in P begins with two empty buffers: m buffer , correspond-
ing to messages that they may AARB-deliver, and m delivered , corresponding to all messages that
they have AARB-delivered. Each process also tracks ID , which uniquely identifies an instance of
AARB-broadcast. For a given instance of AARBP identified by ID , all messages sent by non-
faulty processes must contain ID . Similarly, messages must contain one of three headers: INIT,
corresponding to the initial broadcast of a process’ proposal, ECHO, corresponding to an acknowl-
edgement of the INIT message, or READY, corresponding to an acknowledgement that enough
processes have received the message to ensure eventual, safe AARB-delivery.
Protocol. We now present AARBP (Algorithm 1). To begin, each process pi broadcasts
(ID ,INIT,m′, σ′) over anonymous channels (line 7), where σ′ ← Sign(i, ID ,m′). Upon first re-
ceipt of each message of the form (ID ,INIT,m, σ), a process checks the following (line 8):
• Whether the signature σ is well-formed as per VerifySig, verifying the signer’s membership in
P (line 9).
• Whether any message in m buffer ∪m delivered is not independent from m via Trace, ensuring
AARB-Unicity as m is discarded if double-signing is detected (lines 11 to 14).
Then, given that (m,σ) passes the above checks, (ID ,ECHO,m, σ) is broadcast (line 17). Note that
this broadcast, and all subsequent broadcasts with respect to (m,σ), are performed over regular
(reliable, non-anonymous) channels of communication. To mitigate de-anonymisation, the signer of
m performs the same message processing and message propagation as all other non-faulty processes.
The rest of the protocol proceeds as per Bracha’s reliable broadcast [9]: If processes re-
ceive (ID ,ECHO,m, σ) from more than n+t2 different processes, they broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ)
(lines 18–20). If processes receive (ID ,READY,m, σ) from t+ 1 different processes, they broadcast
(ID ,READY,m, σ) if not yet done (lines 21–23). This ensures convergence and implies that at
least one non-faulty process must have sent (ID ,READY,m, σ) to the receiving process. Once pro-
cesses have received (ID ,READY,m, σ) from 2t+ 1 different processes, they AARB-deliver (m,σ)
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Algorithm 1 AARBP
1: Initial State:
2: m buffer ← ∅ B Buffer of messages
3: m delivered ← ∅ B Delivered messages
4: ID B Identifier for the instance of AARB-broadcast
5: AARBP[ID ](m′):
6: σ′ ← Sign(i, ID ,m′)
7: anon broadcast (ID ,INIT,m′, σ′)
8: upon initial receipt of (ID ,INIT,m, σ)
9: valid ← (VerifySig(ID ,m, σ) = 1)
10: if valid then
11: for each (m∗, σ∗) ∈ m buffer ∪ m delivered do
12: if Trace(ID ,m, σ,m∗, σ∗) 6= “indep” then
13: valid ← false B Double-signing detected
14: break
15: m buffer ← m buffer ∪ {(m, σ)}
16: if valid then
17: broadcast (ID ,ECHO,m, σ)
18: upon receipt (ID ,ECHO,m, σ) from bn+t
2
c + 1 pro-
cesses
19: if (ID ,READY,m, σ) not yet broadcast then
20: broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ)
21: upon receipt (ID ,READY,m, σ) from (t + 1) pro-
cesses
22: if (ID ,READY,m, σ) not yet broadcast then
23: broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ)
24: upon receipt (ID ,READY,m, σ) from (2t + 1) pro-
cesses
25: if (m,σ) /∈ m delivered then
26: m delivered ← m delivered ∪ {(m,σ)}
27: m buffer ← m buffer \ {(m, σ)}
28: AARB-deliver[ID ](m,σ)
with respect to ID if not yet done (line 28). At this point, at least t + 1 non-faulty processes
must have broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ). Thus, all non-faulty processes will eventually propagate
(ID ,READY,m, σ).
Complexity. Whilst Bracha’s protocol [9] requires three message steps to converge, AARBP
requires an initial, anonymous message step and two (regular) message steps. Both AARBP and
n invocations of Bracha’s protocol have a message complexity of O(n3). If we consider unsigned
messages to be of size O(1), then each message propagated in AARBP is of size O(kn), the size
of a traceable ring signature as in [29]. Thus, the bit complexity of all-to-all AARBP is O(kn4)
(as opposed to O(n3) in all-to-all reliable broadcast [9]). To reduce the bit complexity when some
messages are delivered in order, we can hash ECHO and READY messages [13]. Consequently,
communication complexity can be reduced to O((c+ k)n3).
We consider cryptographic overhead as if Fujisaki and Suzuki’s TRS scheme [29] were used. In
AARBP, each process signs one message (O(n) work), verifies up to n messages (O(n2) work), and
perform tracing upon receipt of each INIT message (up to n). Naively, tracing signatures pairwise
requires O(n) operations, and so processes have to perform O(n)+2O(n)+· · ·+(n−1)O(n) = O(n3)
work. This can be sped up by populating a hash table with the individual values of each tag as
defined in [29]. Thus, processes can perform n expected O(1) lookups per tuple (m,σ), requiring
O(n2) expected work tracing overall.
4 Anonymous proposer vector consensus
In this section, we introduce the anonymous proposer vector consensus problem and present and
discuss the protocol Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP) that solves it. We
defer its proof to Appendix C. The anonymous proposer vector consensus problem brings anonymity
to the vector consensus problem [25] where non-faulty processes reach an agreement upon a vector
containing at least n− t proposed values. More precisely, the anonymous proposer vector consensus
ensures that a process’ proposal is indistinguishable from that of all non-faulty processes. In
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electronic voting, this provides a natural mechanism to prevent double-voting and enforce election
eligibility requirements. Each process is equipped with two operations. Firstly, “AVCP[ID ](m)”
begins execution of an instance of AVCP with respect to the identifier ID and proposal m. Secondly,
“AVC-decide[ID ](V )” denotes the output of V from an instance of consensus, and is invoked exactly
once with respect to ID . We define a protocol that solves anonymous vector consensus with respect
to these operations as satisfying the following four properties:
1. AVC-Anonymity: Suppose that m is proposed by a non-faulty process pi. Then, it is
impossible for the adversary to determine the value of i with probability Pr > 1n−t .
It also requires the original agreement and termination properties of vector consensus to be ensured:
2. AVC-Agreement: All non-faulty processes that decide output the same vector V .
3. AVC-Termination: Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a vector of proposals.
It also requires a validity property that depends on a pre-determined, deterministic validity pred-
icate valid() [13, 20] which we assume is common to all processes. We assume that all non-faulty
processes propose a value that satisfies valid().
4. AVC-Validity: Consider each non-faulty process. Each value v ∈ V that is decided must
satisfy valid(), and |V | ≥ n − t. Further, at least |V | − t values correspond to the proposals of
distinct non-faulty processes.
AVCP. A simple protocol solving anonymous proposer vector consensus may be designed as
follows: (i) Every process anonymously broadcasts (or sends to a leader) a message which is signed
with a traceable ring signature; (ii) each process (or a leader) waits for the receipt of n− t messages
that satisfy valid(); (iii) processes perform multivalued (or vector) consensus with respect to their
≥ n− t delivered, valid messages. Using a leader-based algorithm like PBFT [16] in step (iii) would
enable the leader to impose any n−t valid values onto P . In particular, the leader may deliberately
include values from a corrupt coalition and exclude other values. Using DBFT [20] directly would
largely alleviate this issue, although would incur an additional message step and unduly increase
communication complexity, since every TRS is of size O(kn) (thus every proposal is of size O(kn2)).
In contrast, we present a reduction which may converge in three message steps and one anony-
mous message step, by comparison to four message steps as in DBFT, and is similarly efficient in
message complexity. The protocol is divided into two components. Firstly, the reduction component
(Algorithm 2) reduces anonymous proposer vector consensus to binary consensus. It is similar to
DBFT [20], which in turn is similar to Ben-Or et al.’s [6], in which n instances of reliable broadcast
and binary consensus are executed. But, since proposals are made anonymously, processes cannot
associate proposals with binary consensus instances a priori. Consequently, processes start with n
unlabelled binary consensus instances, and label them over time with the hash digest of proposals
they deliver (of the form h ∈ {0, 1}∗). To cope with messages sent and received in unlabelled
binary consensus instances, we require a handler component (Algorithm 3) that replaces function
calls made in binary consensus instances.
Functions. In addition to the communication primitives detailed in Section 2 and the two prim-
itives “AVCP” and “AVC-decide”, the following primitives may be called: “inst.bin propose(v)”,
where inst is an instance of binary consensus and v ∈ {0, 1}, begins execution of inst with initial
value v, “AARBP” and “AARB-deliver”, as in Section 3, “valid()” as described above, “m.keys()”
(resp. “m.values()”), which returns the keys (resp. values) of a map m, “item.key()”, which returns
the key of item in a map m, “s.pop()”, which removes and returns a value from set s, and “H(v)”,
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Algorithm 2 AVCP (1 of 2): Reduction to binary consensus
1: AVCP[ID ](m′):
2: AARBP[ID ](m′)
3: wait until |decided ones| ≥ n− t
4: for each inst ∈ unlabelled ∪ labelled .values() s.t. inst.bin propose() not yet invoked do
5: Invoke inst.bin propose(0)
6: wait until decision count = n
7: AVC-decide[ID](decided ones)
8: upon invocation of AARB-deliver[ID ](m,σ)
9: labelled [H(m || σ)]← unlabelled .pop()
10: if valid(m,σ) then B deterministic, common validity function
11: proposals[H(m || σ)]← (m,σ)
12: Invoke labelled [H(m || σ)].bin propose(1) if not yet invoked
13: upon inst deciding a value v ∈ {0, 1}, where inst ∈ labelled .values() ∪ unlabelled
14: if v = 1 then
15: decided ones ← decided ones ∪ {proposals[inst.key()]}
16: decision count ← decision count + 1
a collision-resistant hash function which returns h ∈ {0, 1}∗ based on v ∈ {0, 1}∗.
State. Each process tracks the following variables: ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, a common identifier for a
given instance of AVCP. proposals[], which maps labels of the form l ∈ {0, 1}∗ to AARB-delivered
messages of the form (m,σ) ∈ ({0, 1}∗, {0, 1}∗) that may be decided, and is initially empty.
decision count , tracking the number of binary consensus instances for which a decision has been
reached, initialised to 0. decided ones, the set of proposals for which 1 was decided in the corre-
sponding binary consensus instance, initialised to ∅. labelled [], which maps labels, which are the
hash digest h ∈ {0, 1}∗ of AARB-delivered proposals, to binary consensus instances, and is initially
empty. unlabelled , a set of binary consensus instances (initially of cardinality n) with no current
label. ones[][], which maps two keys, EST and AUX, to maps with integer keys r ≥ 1 which map
to a set of labels, all of which are initially empty. counts[][], which maps two keys, EST and AUX,
to maps with integer keys r ≥ 1 which map to an integer n ∈ {0, . . . , n}, all of which are initially
empty.
Messages. In addition to messages propagated in AARBP, non-faulty processes process messages
of the form (ID ,TAG, r, label , b), where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX}, r ≥ 1, label ∈ {0, 1}∗ and b ∈ {0, 1}.
A process buffers a message (ID ,TAG, r, label, b) until label labels an instance of binary consensus
inst, at which point it is considered receipt in inst. The handler, described below, ensures that all
messages sent by non-faulty processes eventually correspond to a label in their set labelled .keys().
Similarly, a process can only broadcast such a message after labelling the corresponding instance
of binary consensus. Processes also process messages of the form (ID ,TAG, r, ones), where TAG
∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES}, r ≥ 1, and ones is a set of strings corresponding to binary consensus
instance labels.
Reduction. In the reduction, n (initially unlabelled) instances of binary consensus are used, each
corresponding to a value that one process in P may propose. Each (non-faulty) process invokes
AARBP with respect to ID and their value m′ (line 2), anonymously broadcasting (m′, σ′). On
AARB-delivery of some message (m,σ), an unlabelled instance of binary consensus is deposited
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Algorithm 3 AVCP (2 of 2): Handler
17: upon invoking “broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)”
(line 17 in Algorithm 4) in
inst ∈ labelled .values() ∪ unlabelled
18: if b = 1 then
19: broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)
20: ones[EST][r]← ones[EST][r] ∪ {inst .key()}
21: counts[EST][r]← counts[EST][r] + 1
22: if counts[EST][r] = n ∧ |ones[EST][r]| < n then
23: broadcast (ID ,EST ONES, r, ones[EST][r])
24: upon invoking “broadcast (ID ,AUX, r, label , b)”
(line 7 in Algorithm 4) in
inst ∈ labelled .values() ∪ unlabelled
25: if b = 1 then
26: broadcast (ID ,AUX, r, label , b)
27: ones[AUX][r]← ones[AUX][r] ∪ {inst .key()}
28: counts[AUX][r]← counts[AUX][r] + 1
29: if counts[AUX][r] = n ∧ |ones[AUX][r]| < n then
30: broadcast (ID ,AUX ONES, r, ones[AUX][r])
31: upon receipt of (ID ,TAG, r, ones), where
TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES}
32: wait until one ∈ labelled .keys() ∀one ∈ ones
33: if TAG = EST ONES then
34: TEMP ← EST
35: else TEMP ← AUX
36: for each l ∈ labelled .keys() such that l /∈ ones do
37: deliver (ID ,TEMP, r, l, 0) in labelled [l]
38: for each inst ∈ unlabelled do
39: deliver (ID ,TEMP, r,⊥, 0) in inst
into labelled , whose key (label) is set to H(m || σ) (line 9). Proposals that fulfil valid() are stored in
proposals (line 11), and inst.bin propose(1) is invoked with respect to the newly labelled instance
inst = labelled [H(m || σ)] if not yet done (line 12). Upon termination of each instance (line 13),
provided 1 was decided, the corresponding proposal is added to decided ones (line 15). For either
decision value, decision count is incremented (line 16). Once 1 has been decided in n− t instances
of binary consensus, processes will propose 0 in all instances that they have not yet proposed in
(line 5). Note that upon AARB-delivery of valid messages after this point, bin propose(1) is not
invoked at line 12. Upon the termination of all n instances of binary consensus (after line 6), all
non-faulty processes decide their set of values for which 1 was decided in the corresponding instance
of binary consensus (line 7).
Handler. As proposals are anonymously broadcast, binary consensus instances cannot be asso-
ciated with process identifiers a priori, and so are labelled by AARB-delivered messages. Thus,
we require the handler, which overrides two of the three broadcast calls in the non-terminating
variant of the binary consensus of [20] (Algorithm 4). We defer the reader to Appendix B for a
description of the non-terminating algorithm, and the components of the terminating variant that
require handling.
We now describe the handler (Algorithm 3). Let inst be an instance of binary consensus.
On calling inst.bin propose(b) (b ∈ {0, 1}) (and at the beginning of each round r > 1), processes
invoke BV-broadcast (line 5 of Algorithm 4), immediately calling “broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)”
(line 17 of Algorithm 4). If b = 1, (ID ,EST, r, label , 1) is broadcast, and label is added to the set
ones[EST][r] (line 20). Note that, given AARB-Termination-2, all messages sent by non-faulty
processes of the form (ID ,EST, r, label , 1) will be deposited in an instance inst labelled by label .
Then, as the binary consensus routine terminates when all non-faulty processes propose the same
value, all processes will decide the value 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus (i.e. will pass
line 3), after which they execute bin propose(0) in the remaining instances of binary consensus.
Since these instances may not be labelled when a process wishes to broadcast a value of the
form (ID ,EST, r, label, 0), we defer their broadcast until “broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label, b)” is called
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in all n instances of binary consensus. At this point (line 22), (ID ,EST ONES, r, ones[EST ][r]) is
broadcast (line 23). A message of the form (ID ,EST ONES, r, ones) is interpreted as the receipt
of zeros in all instances not labelled by elements in ones (at lines 37 and 39). This can only be
done once all elements of ones label instances of binary consensus (i.e., after line 32). Note that
if |ones[EST][r] = n|, then there are no zeroes to be processed by receiving processes, and so the
broadcast at line 23 can be skipped.
Handling “broadcast (ID ,AUX, r, label , b)” calls (line 7 of Algorithm 4) is identical to the han-
dling of initial “broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)” calls. Note that the third broadcast in the original
algorithm, where (ID ,EST, r, label , b) is broadcast upon receipt from t+ 1 processes if not yet done
before (line 19 of Algorithm 4 (BV-Broadcast)), can only occur once the corresponding instance
of binary consensus is labelled. Thus, it does not need to be handled. From here, we can see that
messages in the handler are processed as if n instances of the original binary consensus algorithm
were executing.
Table 1: Comparing the complexity of AVCP and DBFT [20] after GST [26]
Complexity AVCP DBFT
Fault-free message complexity O(n3) O(n3)
Worst-case message complexity O(tn3) O(tn3)
Fault-free bit complexity O(cn3 + kn3) O(n3)
Worst-case bit complexity O(kn4 + ctn3) O(tn3)
Complexity and optimizations. Let k be a security parameter, and c the size of a message
digest. We compare the message and communication complexity of AVCP with DBFT [20], which,
as written, can be easily altered to solve vector consensus. We assume that AVCP is invoking
the terminating variant of the binary consensus of [20]. When considering complexity, we only
count messages in the binary consensus routines once the global stabilisation time (GST) has
been reached [26]. Both fault-free and worst-case message complexity are identical between the
two protocols. We remark that there exist runs of AVCP where processes are faulty with O(n3)
message complexity, such as when a process has crashed. In terms of communication complexity,
AVCP is moderately more expensive due to the size of traceable ring signatures (O(kn)). Given
TRS’s of size O(
√
n) [28] are instead used, fault-free and worst-case communication complexities
for AVCP become O(cn3 + kn2
√
n) and O(kn3
√
n+ ctn3) respectively.
As is done in DBFT [20], we can combine the anonymous all-to-all reliable broadcast of a
message m and the proposal of a 1 in the first round of a binary consensus instance. To this end,
a process may skip the BV-broadcast step in round 1, which may allow AVCP to converge in three
message steps and one anonymous message step.
It may be useful to invoke “broadcast TAG[r](b)”, where TAG ∈ {EST,AUX} (lines 19 and
26) when the instance of binary consensus is labelled, rather than simply when b = 1 (i.e., the
condition preceding these calls). Since it may take some time for all n instances of binary consensus
to synchronise, doing this may speed up convergence in the “faster” instances. However, messages
of the form TAG[r](ones), where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES}, would then often contain a
larger ones set.
5 Anonymity in the presence of timing attacks
In our model, there are two modes of adversarial behaviour that can de-anonymise a non-faulty pro-
cess in our protocols: (i) The adversary observes message transmission time between processes [3].
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For example, suppose that the time taken for a process p to transmit a message to all other pro-
cesses in P takes much longer than message transmission time between all other processes. Without
additional assumptions, the adversary can often deduce p’s identity with respect to its proposal.
(ii) The adversary observes messages that different processes send [48]. Consider an application
where a process does not participate in an instance of consensus until the previous instance (if
it exists) has terminated. Suppose in an instance of consensus that n − 1 processes have anony-
mously broadcast their proposals, which have been delivered to some process, but a process p is
still participating in the previous instance of consensus. The adversary can observe this, and can
thus de-anonymise p on receipt of its proposal. To cope with these attack vectors, we posit two
conditions:
1. The order in which a process delivers a message anonymously broadcast is random among
non-faulty processes. This mitigates attacks as in “(i)”.
2. After an instance of consensus terminates, a non-faulty process waits on a local timeout for T
time before starting the next instance of consensus. T is set such that processes are sufficiently
synchronised so that the slowest process terminates after the fastest (non-faulty) process starts
the next instance of consensus. This mitigates attacks as in “(ii)”.
In practice, satisfying these conditions is feasible. To achieve condition 1, we assume first that
messages anonymously broadcast by non-faulty processes are delivered in a random order to each
process. By assuming that the time period over which these messages are delivered is sufficiently
large (larger than T ), and processes execute anon broadcast in a sufficiently timely manner, condi-
tion 1 should with high probability. For condition 2, recall that if a process decides in round r in
an instance of binary consensus, then all non-faulty processes will decide by round r + 2. We can
use this fact, and measurements of message transmission time, to estimate an appropriate value T .
We remark that under general sequential composition where an instance may only execute after
another has terminated, both conditions are required. But, if all instances of AARBP/AVCP are
unrelated in the sense that their execution (a process’ input, when a process can start execution)
does not depend on any other instance, then only condition 1 is required to ensure anonymity. We
show that AARBP and AVCP satisfy their respective anonymity definitions in Appendices A and
C.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented modular and efficient distributed protocols which allow identified
processes to propose values anonymously. In the context of our protocols, we have proposed a
model for achieving anonymity. In terms of future work, it is of interest to evaluate anonymity in
different formal models [34, 51] and with respect to various practical attack vectors [48]. Further,
a reduction to a randomized [14] binary consensus algorithm would remove the dependency on the
weak coordinator in the binary consensus algorithm we rely on [20].
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A Analysis of AARBP
In this appendix, we prove that all properties of anonymous reliable broadcast are fulfilled by our
protocol, Anonymous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP) (Algorithm 1 in Section 3).
Remark 1. Let m,n, t be positive integers s.t. n > 3t. We have:
m >
n− t
2
⇔ m ≥ bn− t
2
+ 1c.
Thus, we refer to “bn−t2 c+ 1 processes” and “more than n−t2 processes” interchangeably.
Lemma A.1. AARBP ensures AARB-Signing. That is, if a non-faulty process pi AARB-delivers
a message, then it must be of the form (m,σ), where a process pi ∈ P invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m).
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Proof. Suppose p is non-faulty and AARB-delivers a message msg. We aim to show that msg =
(m,σ), where σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m) was called by some process pi. For a non-faulty process to
broadcast (ID ,READY,msg), they must have either received (ID ,READY,msg) from t+1 different
processes or (ID ,ECHO,msg) from bn+t2 c+1 different processes. Since t+1 > t, there exists a non-
faulty process p′ that must have broadcast (ID ,READY,msg) on receipt of (ID ,ECHO,msg) from
bn+t2 c+1 different processes to ensure that msg was AARB-delivered to any process. Similarly, since
bn+t2 c + 1 > t, there exists a non-faulty process p′′ that must have broadcast (ID ,ECHO,msg) to
ensure (ID ,READY,msg) was broadcast by a non-faulty process. Process p′′ must have implicitly
checked that msg = (m,σ) and VerifySig(ID ,m, σ) = 1 (at line 9). By signature unforgeability,
VerifySig(ID ,m, σ) = 1 implies that σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m) was called by some process pi. Thus, the
property holds.
Lemma A.2. AARBP ensures AARB-Anonymity under the assumptions of the model (Section 2)
and those made in Section 5. AARB-Anonymity is stated as follows. Let (m,σ) be a tuple anony-
mously broadcast by a non-faulty process pi. Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine
the value of i with probability Pr > 1n−t .
Proof. Since the adversary A can corrupt up to t processes and has access to and controls their
entire state, A can always distinguish between their anonymous proposals. We show that A can-
not determine the identity of a signer of remaining n − t proposals with probability greater than
randomly guessing.
Let pi denote a non-faulty process that invokes AARBP[ID ](m). Process pi invokes
Sign(i, ID ,m), producing the signature σ (line 6). Then, pi invokes “anon broadcast
(ID ,INIT,m, σ)” (line 7). The adversary will eventually see the delivered message at one of its cor-
rupted processes. By signature anonymity, A cannot determine i based on the message alone with
probability Pr > 1n−t . By definition of Sign, the adversary cannot produce call σ
′ ← Sign(i, ID ,m′)
for some m′. Thus, by traceability and entrapment-freeness, the adversary cannot produce (m′, σ′)
such that Trace(ID ,m, σ,m′, σ′) 6= “indep”. In particular, if m′ 6= m, then the adversary cannot
expose the identity of pi through a Trace call, as Trace will never output i.
Now, the adversary can only see calls of the form “send”, “receive” or “anon receive”, and cannot
see the computational history of non-faulty processes. Importantly, the adversary cannot observe
calls that non-faulty processes make to “anon broadcast”. By condition 1 in Section 5, the order
in which each process controlled by the adversary receives m is randomly distributed among the
proposals of all non-faulty processes (each of which anonymously broadcasts). Indeed, the orders
of messages received at each corrupted process are pairwise independent, and so the adversary
gains no additional information about who anonymously broadcast what. Recall from Section 5
that we distinguish between the case where (i) all instances of AARBP are unrelated, and (ii)
executing in a particular instance depends on terminating in another. For case (i), we complete
the proof by remarking that messages sent in other instances of AARBP do not reveal additional
information to the adversary, since all processes can freely participate in the instance in question.
For case (ii), note that condition 2 in Section 5 implies that no non-faulty process is participating
in a previous instance of consensus when invoking AARBP. Thus, a non-faulty process cannot be
de-anonymised by its progress in that instance. Finally, we note that this property holds in the
case that n3 < t ≤ n− 2.
We also note that, if that a non-faulty process only crashes (and does not recover) after calling
anon broadcast, then it cannot be de-anonymised with respect to its proposal. This, however, is
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beyond the scope of our adversarial model, as a process that crashes is assumed to have been
corrupted by the adversary, who can observe its internal state.
Lemma A.3. AARBP ensure AARB-Termination-1. That is, if a process pi is non-faulty and
invokes AARBP[ID ](m), all the non-faulty processes eventually AARB-deliver (m,σ), where σ ←
Sign(i, ID ,m).
Proof. Suppose that the non-faulty process pi invokes AARBP with respect to identifier ID and
message m. So, pi anonymously broadcasts (ID ,INIT,m, σ), where σ = Sign(i, ID ,m). Since
the network is reliable, all non-faulty processes eventually receive (ID ,INIT,m, σ) (and indeed all
messages broadcast by non-faulty processes). At line 9, VerifySig is queried with respect to (m,σ).
By signature correctness, VerifySig(ID ,m, σ) = 1 is guaranteed, since pi invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m).
So, all non-faulty processes proceed to line 11. By traceability and entrapment-freeness, no non-
faulty process could have received a message (m′, σ′) such that Trace(ID ,m, σ,m′, σ′) 6= “indep”.
Consequently, all non-faulty processes reach line 15 with value valid s.t. valid = true. Thus, all
non-faulty processes (of which there are at least n−t) reach line 17, broadcasting (ID ,ECHO,m, σ).
Since n− t > n+t2 , every non-faulty process will eventually receive more than n+t2 (ID ,ECHO,m, σ)
messages, fulfilling the predicate at line 18. More than n+t2 > t + 1 non-faulty processes will not
have broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ), and so will do so (at line 20). Thus, all honest processes will
eventually receive t+ 1 (ID ,READY,m, σ) messages, broadcasting (ID ,READY,m, σ) there if not
yet done. Then, since n− t ≥ 2t+ 1, line 24 will eventually be fulfilled for each non-faulty process.
Thus, every non-faulty process will AARB-deliver (m,σ) at line 28, as required.
Lemma A.4. AARBP ensures AARB-Validity, which is stated as follows. Suppose that a non-
faulty process AARB-delivers (m,σ). Let i = FindIndex(ID ,m, σ) denote the output of an idealised
call to FindIndex. Then if pi is non-faulty, pi must have anonymously broadcast (m,σ).
Proof. Let pi be non-faulty. From the protocol specification, pi must have invoked σ ←
Sign(i, ID ,m). By definition of Sign, no other process could have produced such a value of σ.
By traceability and entrapment-freeness, no other process can produce a tuple (m′, σ′) such that
Trace(ID ,m, σ,m′, σ′) 6= “indep”. Consequently, no process can produce a message that prevents
non-faulty processes from propagating (ID ,ECHO,m, σ) messages. Thus, since pi is non-faulty,
and therefore followed the protocol, pi must have anonymously broadcast (m,σ).
Remark 2. No non-faulty process will broadcast more than one message of the form
(ID ,ECHO,m′, σ′) where σ′ is such that σ′ = Sign(x, ID ,m′) for any message m′.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Lemma A.3: if non-faulty process p receives another message
(m,σ) s.t. σ ← Sign(x, ID ,m) for any m, then Trace(ID ,m, σ,m′, σ′) 6= “indep”, and so p will not
reach line 17.
Lemma A.5. In AARBP, if pi AARB-delivers (m,σ), where σ ← Sign(x, ID ,m), and pj AARB-
delivers (m′, σ′), where σ′ ← Sign(x, ID ,m′), then (m,σ) = (m′, σ).
Proof. For pi (resp. pj) to have AARB-delivered (m,σ) (resp. (m
′, σ′)), pi (resp. pj) must have
broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ) (resp. (ID ,READY,m′, σ′)). Then, one of two predicates (at lines
18 and 21) must have been true for each process. That is, pi (resp. pj) must have received either:
1. (ID ,ECHO,m, σ) (resp. (ID ,ECHO,m′, σ′)) from bn+t2 c different processes, or
2. (ID ,READY,m, σ) (resp. (ID ,READY,m′, σ′)) from (t+ 1) different processes.
19
We first prove the following claim: if (ID ,READY,m, σ) is broadcast by pi, and (ID ,READY,m
′, σ′)
is broadcast by pj , then (m,σ) = (m
′, σ′). Suppose that both processes fulfill condition (1),
receiving ECHO messages from sets of processes P and P ′ respectively, where pi broadcasts
(ID ,READY,m, σ) and pj broadcasts (ID ,READY,m
′, σ′). Assume that (m,σ) 6= (m′, σ′). Then:
|P ∩ P ′| = |P |+ |P ′| − |P ∪ P ′|,
≥ |P |+ |P ′| − n,
> 2
(
n+ t
2
)
− n = t,
⇒ |P ∩ P ′| ≥ t+ 1.
Therefore, P ∩ P ′ must contain at least one correct process, say pc. By Remark 2, pc must have
sent the same ECHO message for some message to both processes, and so pi and pj must have
received the same message (ID ,ECHO,m, σ) = (ID ,ECHO,m′, σ′), contradicting the assumption
that (m,σ) 6= (m′, σ′). Thus, they must broadcast the same READY message.
Suppose now that at least one process broadcasts READY due to condition (2) being fulfilled.
Without loss of generality, assume exactly one process p broadcasts READY on this basis. Then, p
must have received a READY message from at least one correct process (since out of t+1 processes,
at least 1 must be non-faulty), say pa. Either pa received READY from at least one correct process,
say pb, or it satisfied condition (1). By continuing the logic (and since |P | is finite), there must
exist a process p(1) that fulfilled condition (1). Then, by the correctness of processes p(1), . . . , pb, pa,
READY messages sent by pi and pj must be the same, completing the proof.
Therefore, pi broadcasting (ID ,READY,m, σ), and pj broadcasting (ID ,READY,m
′, σ′) implies
(m,σ) = (m′, σ′) given that pi and pj are non-faulty.
We now directly prove the lemma. If pi AARB-delivers (m,σ), it received (ID ,READY,m, σ)
from (2t+ 1) different processes, and thus received (ID ,READY,m, σ) from at least one non-faulty
process. Similarly, if pj AARB-delivers (m
′, σ′), it must have received (ID ,READY,m′, σ′) from
at least one non-faulty process. It follows from the previous claim that all non-faulty processes
broadcast the same READY message. Thus, pi and pj AARB-deliver the same tuple.
Lemma A.6. AARBP ensures AARB-Termination-2. That is, if a non-faulty process AARB-
delivers (m,σ), then all the non-faulty processes eventually AARB-deliver (m,σ).
Proof. By Lemma A.5, all non-faulty processes that AARB-deliver a message (m′, σ′) s.t. σ′ ←
Sign(x, ID ,m′) AARB-deliver (m,σ). Then, pi must have received the message (ID ,READY,m, σ)
from (2t+ 1) processes (line 24), at least t+ 1 of which must be non-faulty. These t+ 1 processes
must have broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ) (at line 20 or 23), and so every non-faulty process will
eventually receive (t + 1) (ID ,READY,m, σ) messages, and thus broadcast (ID ,READY,m, σ) at
some point. Given there are n− t ≥ 2t+ 1 non-faulty processes, each non-faulty process eventually
receives (ID ,READY,m, σ) from at least 2t+ 1 processes. Therefore, every non-faulty process will
AARB-deliver (m,σ).
Lemma A.7. AARBP ensures AARB-Unicity, which is stated as follows. Consider any point of
time in which a non-faulty process p has AARB-delivered more than one tuple. Let delivered =
{(m1, σ1), · · · , (mk, σk)}, where |delivered| = k, denote the set of these tuples. For each i ∈ {1..k},
let outi = FindIndex(ID ,mi, σi) denote the output of an idealised call to FindIndex. Then for all
distinct pairs of tuples {(mi, σi), (mj , σj)}, outi 6= outj.
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Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose that p AARB-delivers
two tuples (m,σ) and (m′, σ′) such that FindIndex(ID ,m, σ) = FindIndex(ID ,m′, σ′). Then,
AARB-Termination-2 implies that all non-faulty processes will eventually AARB-deliver (m,σ)
and (m′, σ′). But, Lemma A.5 asserts that FindIndex(ID ,m, σ) = FindIndex(ID ,m′, σ′), a con-
tradiction. Thus, for each i ∈ {1..n}, p AARB-delivers at most one tuple (m,σ) such that
FindIndex(ID ,m, σ) = i.
Theorem A.1. AARBP (Algorithm 1 in Section 3) satisfies the properties of AARB-Broadcast.
Proof. From Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.4, A.7, A.3 and A.6, it follows that all properties of AARB-
Broadcast are satisfied.
B Binary consensus and BV-broadcast
We first recall the definitions that define the binary Byzantine consensus (BBC) problem as stated
in [20]. We assume that every non-faulty process proposes a value, and remark that only the values
in the set {0, 1} can be decided by a non-faulty process.
• BBC-Termination: Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement: No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity: If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
We present the safe, non-terminating variant of the binary consensus routine from [20]. We also
present the relevant components of the terminating variant that require handling in AVCP, and
describe how to ensure termination. As assumed in the model (Section 2), the terminating routine
relies on partial synchrony between processes in P . The protocols execute in asynchronous rounds.
State. A process keeps track of a binary value est ∈ {0, 1}, a process’ current estimate of the
decided value, arrays bin values[1..], a round number r (initialised to 0), an auxiliary binary value
b, and an auxiliary set of (binary) values values that is initially empty.
Messages. Messages of the form (EST, r, b) and (AUX, r, b), where r ≥ 1 and b ∈ {0, 1}, are sent
and processed by non-faulty processes. Note that we have omitted the dependency on a label label
and identifier ID for simplicity of exposition. In the original paper [20], these messages take the
form EST[r](b) and AUX[r](b).
BV-broadcast. To exchange EST messages, the protocol relies on an all-to-all communication
abstraction, BV-broadcast [43], which satisfies the following properties for a given round r ≥ 1 that
a process is executing:
• BV-Obligation: If at least (t+1) non-faulty processes BV-broadcast the same value v, then
v will eventually be added to the set bin values of each non-faulty process.
• BV-Justification: If p is non-faulty and v ∈ bin values[r], then v must have been BV-
broadcast by a non-faulty process.
• BV-Uniformity: If v is added to a non-faulty process p’s bin values[r] set, then eventually
v ∈ bin values[r] at every non-faulty process.
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• BV-Termination: Eventually, bin values[r] becomes non-empty for every non-faulty pro-
cess.
Primarily, BV-broadcast serves to filter values that are only proposed by faulty processes (BV-
Obligation, BV-Justification), to ensure progress (BV-Termination), and to work towards agree-
ment (BV-Uniformity).
Functions. Let b ∈ {0, 1}. In addition to BV-broadcast and the communication primitives in our
model (Section 2), a process can invoke bin propose(b) to begin executing an instance of binary
consensus with input b, and decide(b) to decide the value b. In a given instance of binary consensus,
these two functions may be called exactly once.
Algorithm 4 Safe binary consensus routine
1: bin propose(v):
2: est← v; r ← 0;
3: repeat:
4: r ← r + 1;
5: BV-broadcast(EST, r, est)
6: wait until (bin values[r] 6= ∅)
7: broadcast (AUX, r, bin values[r])
8: wait until messages (AUX, r, b valp(1)), · · · , (AUX, r, b valp(n−t)) have been received from (n−t)
processes p(x), 1 ≤ x ≤ n− t with contents s.t. ∃ values 6= ∅ where the following two conditions hold:
• values = ∪1≤x≤n−tb valp(x)
• values ⊆ bin values[r ]
9: b← r (mod 2)
10: if values = {v} then
11: est← v;
12: if v = b then
13: decide(v) if not yet invoked decide()
14: else
15: est← b
16: BV-broadcast(EST, r, vi):
17: broadcast (EST, r, vi)
18: upon receipt of (EST, r, v)
19: if (EST, r, v) received from (t+ 1) processes and (EST, r, v) not yet broadcast then
20: broadcast (EST, r, v)
21: if (EST, r, v) received from (2t+ 1) processes then
22: bin values[r]← bin values[r] ∪ {v}
Protocol description. Upon the invocation bin propose(b), where b ∈ {0, 1}, a process will
enter a sequence of asynchronous rounds.
In a given round, a process will invoke BV-broadcast (line 5), broadcasting its current estimate
(line 17) for the round r, which is est. In an instance of BV-broadcast, after receiving a binary
value from t + 1 different processes, a process will broadcast the value if not yet done (line 19).
Eventually, a process will BV-deliver a value v upon reception from 2t + 1 different processes,
fulfilling the condition at line 21. In doing so, a process will append v to its set bin values[r] (line
22), and we note that bin values[r] is not necessarily in its final form at this point in time.
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Since bin values[r] is now a singleton set (after line 6), non-faulty processes will broadcast the
value v contained in bin values[r] (line 7). Then, processes wait until they can form a set values
s.t. values ⊆ bin values and values is formed from at least n− t (AUX, r, b) messages received (line
8). This ensures that enough processes have sent messages to be able to (potentially) decide, and
that only values BV-broadcast previously are considered candidates for being decided.
Then, processes attempt to decide a value via local computation. b is set to r (mod 2) (line 9),
and then each process checks the following:
• If values = {v} is singleton, the estimate for the next round is set to v (line 11).
• Given values is singleton, v is then decided if r (mod 2) = v, (lines 12 and 13). If this does
not hold, the value can be decided in the next round provided that values is a singleton at
line 11.
• Else, values contains 2 values, and est is set to be r (mod 2) (line 15), as a process cannot
decide at this point.
Note that, upon invocation of decide(), processes still participate in the protocol, enabling other
processes who may not have decided to decide. The interested reader may verify the correctness of
this protocol, and the corresponding terminating, partially-synchronous protocol in [20].
Handling termination. The terminating algorithm (Figure 2 in [20]) uses in each round an
additional broadcast, which is performed by a rotating coordinator. Note that i ∈ {1, . . . , n} denotes
the index of the process pi who is locally executing instructions, and that these instructions are
executed after bin values[r] 6= ∅ (i.e. after line 6 of Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 5 Additional broadcast in Figure 2 of [20]
1: coord← (r − 1) (mod n) + 1
2: if i = coord then
3: w = bin values[r]
4: broadcast (COORD VALUE, r, w)
This broadcast call can be handled exactly as in the logic beginning at lines 17 and 24 of the
handler (Algorithm 3), provided that for a given round r, the coordinator is common across all n
instances of consensus. No other communication steps are added in the terminating algorithm.
In the non-terminating binary consensus algorithm, a process executes indefinitely after invoking
decide(). The terminating variant, by contrast, imposes certain conditions upon termination, which
are checked at the end of each round r. In the context of the following algorithm excerpt, a process
that invokes the instruction halt discontinues executing instructions in the binary consensus instance
that halt was called in, and drops all related messages.
Algorithm 6 Termination conditions in Figure 2 of [20]
1: if decide() invoked in round r then
2: wait until bin values[r ] = {0, 1}
3: else
4: if decide() invoked in round r − 2 then halt
It is shown in [20] that, given that some non-faulty process decides in round r, all non-faulty
processes will decide by round r + 2. Note that a process may invoke decide() in different rounds
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in different instances of binary consensus. Thus, a process may invoke halt in some, but not
all, instances of binary consensus. Suppose that a process has invoked halt in k instances of
binary consensus, where 1 < k < n, in some round r. Then, broadcasting a message with header
EST ONES in the handler (Algorithm 3), say, will be impossible, since counts[EST][r] will never
be incremented to n.
To cope with this problem, we define a new termination condition. Let rmax be the largest
round number of the n instances of binary consensus that a given process decides in. Then, that
process can invoke halt at the end of round rmax + 2.
C Analysis of AVCP
In this appendix, we prove that the properties of anonymous proposer vector consensus (AVC),
presented in Section 4, are satisfied by our protocol Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol
(AVCP) (Algorithms 2 and 3).
Lemma C.1. In AVCP, for each identifier ID, a non-faulty process’ data structure “labelled []”
is such that |labelled .values()| ≤ n. Further, no two binary consensus instances are labelled by the
same value l.
Proof. For the first part of the lemma, recall that an instance inst is only moved to labelled at
line 9 upon AARB-delivery of (m,σ). By AARB-Unicity, a non-faulty process will AARB-deliver
at most one tuple (m,σ) for every process pi s.t. σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m). Since |P | = n, at most n
instances inst will thus be moved to labelled .
For the second part of the lemma, recall that we assume signature uniqueness. Thus, every
tuple (m,σ) anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process is unique. Moreover, any duplicate
tuple (m,σ), even if broadcast by a faulty process, cannot be AARB-delivered twice (checked at
line 25). Thus, by the collision-resistance of H, H(m || σ) 6= H(m′ || σ′) for any two distinct tuples
(m,σ) and (m′, σ′) that are AARB-delivered. Since each instance is labelled by H(m || σ′) for some
tuple (m,σ), it follows that no two instances will conflict in label.
Lemma C.2. Consider AVCP. Let p be a non-faulty process. Then, given that the “for” loop on
lines 38 and 39 is executed as an atomic operation, all instances in unlabelled .values() will contain
the same set of messages.
Proof. At the protocol’s outset, all instances of binary consensus are in labelled , where no messages
have been received. The only place that messages are deposited to unlabelled instances is at lines 38
and 39, where messages are deposited into all members of unlabelled . Finally, note that instances
can only moved out of unlabelled , which occurs at line 9.
Lemma C.3. In AVCP, a non-faulty process p sends a message of the form (ID ,TAG, r, label , b),
then there locally exists an instance of binary consensus inst such that labelled [label ] = inst.
Proof. Suppose p sends (ID ,EST, r, label , b). If b = 1, then one of three scenarios holds: (i) r = 1
and p has invoked inst.bin propose(1) where labelled [label ] = inst, (ii) r ≥ 1, p has received t + 1
messages of the form (ID ,EST, r, label , b) and has not yet broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b), or (iii)
their value est was set to b = 1 at the end of the previous round of binary consensus. In case (i),
note that bin propose(1) (at line 12) is executed after inst is labelled (at line 9). Note that in both
cases (ii) and (iii), p must have processed messages of the form (ID ,EST, r, label , 1). As described in
the text, these messages are only processed after the AARB-delivery of the corresponding message
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(m,σ) where label = H(m || σ) and some instance inst is labelled by label (at line 9). If b = 0,
only case (ii) needs to be considered, since the other broadcast call is handled by the handler
(Algorithm 3). Here, b = 1 must have been initially broadcast, which is described by cases (i) and
(iii). Suppose p sends (ID ,AUX, r, label , b). Note that b 6= 0, since the handler handles this case.
Thus, we consider b = 1. b must have been BV-delivered (line 6 of Algorithm 4), requiring p to have
processed messages of the form (ID ,EST, r, label , b), which requires some instance to be labelled by
label to do. This exhausts the possibilities.
Lemma C.4. Consider AVCP. Let r ≥ 1 be an integer. Then, all messages sent by non-
faulty processes of the form (ID ,TAG, r, label , b) where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX} and b ∈ {0, 1}, and
(ID ,TAG, r, ones) where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES} and b ∈ {0, 1}, are eventually de-
posited into the corresponding binary consensus instances of a non-faulty process.
Proof. Let p be the recipient of a message in the above forms. We first consider messages of the
form (ID ,TAG, r, label , b) where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX} and b ∈ {0, 1}. By Lemma C.3, the non-
faulty sender of such a message must have AARB-delivered some message (m,σ) such that label =
H(m || σ). By AARB-Termination-2, p will eventually AARB-deliver (m,σ) and subsequently
label an instance of binary consensus which is uniquely defined by label (Lemma C.1). Thus, p
will eventually process (ID ,TAG, r, label , b) in instance inst = labelled [label ]. Consider messages of
the form (ID ,TAG, r, ones) where TAG ∈ {EST ONES, AUX ONES} and b ∈ {0, 1}. Since the
sender is non-faulty, every element of ones (i.e. every label) must correspond to a message that was
AARB-delivered by the sender. By AARB-Termination-2, p will eventually AARB-deliver these
messages, label instances of binary consensus (at line 9) and thus progress beyond line 32. Thus,
p will deposit 0 in all instances not labelled by elements of ones (at lines 37 and 39), which is the
prescribed behaviour.
Lemma C.5. In AVCP, every non-faulty process reaches line 5, i.e. decides 1 in n − t instances
of binary consensus.
Proof. Given at most t faulty processes, at least n − t non-faulty processes invoke AARBP at
line 2, broadcasting a value that satisfies valid() by assumption. By AARB-Termination-1, every
message anonymously broadcast by a non-faulty process is eventually AARB-delivered by all non-
faulty processes. Suppose a non-faulty process p labels an instance of consensus inst by one of
these messages. By Lemma C.4, all messages sent by non-faulty processes associated with inst
are eventually processed by p. Then, all non-faulty processes will invoke bin propose(1) in at least
n− t instances of binary consensus (i.e. while blocked at line 3). Consider the first n− t instances
of consensus for which a decision is made at. By the intrusion tolerance of binary consensus, no
coalition of faulty processes can force 0 to be a valid value in these consensus instances, since all non-
faulty processes must invoke bin propose(1) in them. Then, by BBC-Agreement, BBC-Validity and
BBC-Termination, all non-faulty processes will eventually decide 1 in n− t BIN CONS instances.
Thus, all non-faulty processes eventually reach line 5.
We now prove that AVC-Validity holds.
Theorem C.1. AVCP satisfies AVC-Validity, which is stated as follows. Consider each non-faulty
process. Each value v ∈ V that is decided must satisfy valid(), and |V | ≥ n − t. Further, at least
|V | − t values correspond to the proposals of distinct non-faulty processes.
Proof. Let p be a non-faulty process. By construction of the binary consensus algorithm, p must
process messages of the form (ID ,TAG, r, label , b) where TAG ∈ {EST, AUX} and b ∈ {0, 1} to
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reach a decision. By Lemma C.4, p must have AARB-delivered the corresponding message (m,σ)
such that label = H(m || σ) before deciding. That is, proposals must have been populated with the
corresponding message (m,σ) at line 11, and valid() must be true for (m,σ), checked previously
at line 10. By Lemma C.5, p eventually decides 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus. Upon
each decision, the corresponding message is added to V = decided ones (at line 15). For the latter
component of the definition, we note that ARB-Unicity ensures that each value in V contains a
signature produced by a different process. So, given V is decided, at most t of the corresponding
signatures could have been produced by faulty processes.
Lemma C.6. Consider AVCP. Fix r ≥ 1. Given that a non-faulty process p invokes “broadcast
(ID ,EST, r, label , b)” or “broadcast (ID ,AUX, r, label , b)” in all n instances of binary consensus,
then all non-faulty processes interpret the corresponding messages sent by p as if p were executing
the original binary consensus algorithm.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose p invokes “broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)” in all n
instances of binary consensus. For every instance inst such that b = 1, p broadcasts
(ID ,EST, r, label , b) (at line 19) which is identical to the behaviour in the original algorithm. Note
that p does not broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b) here when b = 0. By Lemma C.3, p must have
labelled inst with label . Thus, p adds label to ones[EST][r] (at line 20). Once n invocations of
“broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)” have been executed, ones[EST][r] is sent to all non-faulty pro-
cesses. By Lemma C.4, all non-faulty processes deposit 0 in all instances not labelled by elements
of ones[EST][r], corresponding to all broadcasts not performed by p previously. In this sense, this
behaviour is equivalent to having broadcast all values (ID ,EST, r, label , b) where b = 0.
Theorem C.2. AVCP ensures AVC-Termination. That is, every non-faulty process eventually
decides on a vector of proposals.
Proof. Consider a non-faulty process p. By Lemma C.5, p reaches line 5 with n − t values in
their local array decided ones. At this point, p invokes bin propose(0) in all other instances of
binary consensus. Since all n instances are thus executed, p will eventually invoke “broadcast
(ID ,EST, r, label , b)” in all n instances of binary consensus. By Lemma C.6, non-faulty processes
interpret p’s corresponding messages as if p were executing the original binary consensus algorithm.
Similarly, p will eventually invoke “broadcast (ID ,AUX, r, label , b)” in all n instances.
Note that DBFT [20] is guaranteed termination with n instances of binary consensus as each
instance is guaranteed to terminate due to BBC-Termination. It remains to show that AVCP
preserves BBC-Termination for all n instances of consensus. Lemma 11 in [20] states that, at some
point after which the global stabilistation time (GST) is reached, any execution of the original
binary consensus routine eventually executes in synchronous steps. Note that in our construction,
the slowest binary consensus instance is no slower than if n instances of the original binary consensus
routine were executing. For example, in AVCP, a message of the form (EST ONES , r, ones) is sent
after n invocations of “broadcast (ID ,EST, r, label , b)” are performed for a given r. Then, Lemma C.6
implies that messages sent by non-faulty processes remain unchanged as in an execution of n
instances of the original binary consensus routine. Thus, Lemma 11 holds for the slowest instance
of consensus. Since all other instances are faster, they too are synchronised, and so Lemma 11 holds
for them also. By Lemma 9 in [20], which asserts that BBC-Termination holds for an instance of
binary consensus, it follows that each non-faulty process will decide a value in the n instances of
consensus in AVCP. At this point, p immediately returns decided ones (at line 7). Since p was
arbitrary (but non-faulty), it follows that AVC-Termination holds.
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Theorem C.3. AVCP ensures AVC-Agreement. That is, all non-faulty processes that decide output
the same vector V .
Proof. Consider two non-faulty processes, pi and pj that have decided (AVC-Termination). Suppose
that pi has decided decided ones. Each value in decided ones must have been AARB-delivered to
pi in order to decide 1 in the corresponding instances of binary consensus (Lemma C.3). By
AARB-Unicity and AARB-Termination-2, pj will AARB-deliver all values in decided ones. By
Lemma C.5, all non-faulty processes eventually decide 1 in n − t instances of binary consensus.
Consequently, pi and pj participate in all n instances of binary consensus which by Lemma C.6 is
equivalent to participating in n instances of binary consensus as per the original algorithm. Then,
by BBC-Agreement, pj decides 1 in an instance of binary consensus if and only if pi decides 1 in
that instance. Consequently, each corresponding value, which have all been AARB-delivered prior
to deciding 1 in each instance of binary consensus (Lemma C.3) will be added to pj ’s local array
decided ones ′. Thus, decided ones ′ = decided ones.
Theorem C.4. AVCP ensures AVC-Anonymity under the assumptions of our model (Section 2)
and the three conditions described in Section 5. AVC-Anonymity is stated as follows: Suppose that
m is proposed by a non-faulty process pi. Then, it is impossible for the adversary to determine the
value of i with probability Pr > 1n−t .
Proof. We note that each process invokes AARBP at the beginning of any execution of AVCP. So,
the proof of AVC-Anonymity follows directly from the proof of AARB-Anonymity (Lemma A.2).
D Composing threshold encryption and AVCP
Threshold encryption involves a set of processes who have a common encryption key, and an
individual share of the decryption key. A k-out-of-n threshold encryption scheme requires the joint
collaboration of k processes to decrypt any encrypted value. Importantly, k−1 or less processes are
unable to determine any additional information about a given encrypted value in collaboration. The
keying material can be reused in the sense that many values can be decrypted without compromising
the security of the scheme.
AVCP assumes that up to t processes may be Byzantine faulty. Thus, by setting the decryption
threshold to t+1, a coalition of t malicious processes are unable to deduce the contents of encrypted
values until a non-faulty process initiates threshold decryption. Consequently, a protocol that
ensures that the contents of all non-faulty process’ proposals to an instance of AVCP is not revealed
until after termination can be designed as follows:
1. All processes encrypt their proposal under a pre-determined public key.
2. All processes invoke AVCP with input as their encrypted value.
3. Upon termination, all processes initiate threshold decryption.
D.1 Preliminaries
We assume that the assumptions made by AVCP, including those made in our model (Section 2),
hold true. In particular, the dealer generates the initial state, including the values of n and t. As
such, the decryption threshold for the instance of threshold encryption is set to k = t + 1. We
assume that the distributed oracle also handles queries of the following functions:
27
1. c ← Enc(ID ,m), which takes identifier ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, and
outputs the ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}∗. All parties (even those not in P ) may query Enc.
2. b ← VerifyEnc(ID , c), which takes identifier ID and ciphertext c as input, and outputs a bit
b ∈ {0, 1}. All parties may query VerifyEnc.
3. σ ← ShareGen(i, ID , c), which takes integer i ∈ {1..n}, identifier ID and ciphertext c as input,
and outputs the decryption share σ ∈ {0, 1}∗. We restrict the interface ShareGen such that
only process pi ∈ P may invoke ShareGen with first argument i.
4. b ← VerifyShare(ID , c, σ), which takes identifier ID , ciphertext c and decryption share σ as
input, and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. All parties may query VerifyShare.
5. m← Dec(ID , c,Σ), which takes the identifier ID , ciphertext c and set Σ = {σ1, . . . , σk} of k
decryption shares, and outputs the plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}∗. All parties may query Dec.
These definitions are inspired by those used in defining Shoup and Gennaro’s non-interactive
threshold encryption scheme [53]. The behaviour of calls to the above functions satisfies the fol-
lowing properties:
• Encryption correctness and non-malleability: VerifyEnc(ID , c) = 1 ⇐⇒ there exists a
party which previously invoked Enc(ID ,m) and obtained c as a response. Non-malleability is
captured by the “⇒” claim, which ensures that any correct encryption was produced by a call
to Enc. In particular, non-malleability implies that combining any value and an encryption
will not produce another valid encryption.
• Share correctness and unforgeability: VerifyShare(ID , c, σ) = 1 ⇐⇒ there exists process
pi ∈ P that previously invoked ShareGen(i, ID , c) and obtained σ as a result.
• Decryption correctness and decryption security: Dec(ID , c,Σ) = m, where m was the
input to a previous call to Enc(ID ,m) ⇐⇒ the following conditions are met:
1. c← Enc(ID ,m) was called by some party.
2. Σ = {σ1, . . . , σk} (|Σ| = k), where for each distinct pair σi, σj ∈ Σ, distinct pro-
cesses pi, pj ∈ P (i 6= j) respectively called σi ← ShareGen(i, ID , c) and σj ←
ShareGen(j, ID , c).
The “⇐” claim captures decryption correctness. The “⇒” claim captures security, ensuring
that k valid shares produced by distinct processes are required for decryption.
• Encryption hiding: Suppose c← Enc(ID ,m) is called by a party p. Then, m can only be
obtained by either p revealing m or a valid call m← Dec(ID , c,Σ) being made.
D.2 Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE)
At a high level, processes first perform AVCP with respect to their proposal which is encrypted
under the threshold encryption scheme. Then, processes perform threshold decryption, which
requires an additional message delay for termination. We call this algorithm an Arbitrary Ballot
Election (ABE), since processes can propose arbitrary values and are ensured of certain properties
that are defined in the context of electronic voting. We describe and prove these hold in the next
subsection.
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Functions. Each process has access to the distributed oracle and in addition to all functions
invoked AVCP (Section 4). For a given tuple (m,σ) we assume that the predicate valid() in AVCP
returns true only if VerifyEnc(ID ,m) = 1. That is, m was the result of a query to Enc(ID ,msg) for
some msg ∈ {0, 1}∗.
State. Each process tracks the variables ID, a string uniquely identifying an instance of ABE, has-
broadcast, a Boolean that is initially false, unique-encs and plaintexts, sets of messages m ∈ {0, 1}∗
that are initially empty, and partial-decs, which maps ciphertexts to sets of decryption shares, each
of which are initially empty.
Messages. In addition to messages propagated in AVCP (which includes messages from AARBP),
messages of the form (DECS, ID , encs) are propagated, where encs is a map, each value of which
is a singleton set.
Algorithm 7 Arbitrary ballot election (ABE)
1: ABE(m):
2: c ← Enc(ID ,m)
3: encs ← AVCP[ID ](m)
4: for each (disjoint) set of values M = {(m1, σ1), . . . , (mk, σl)} ⊆ encs s.t. m1 = · · · = ml do
5: unique-encs ← unique-encs ∪ {m1}
6: return decryption(unique-encs)
7: decryption(encs):
8: for each c in encs do
9: σ ← ShareGen(i, ID , c)
10: partial-decs[c]← {σ}
11: broadcast (DECS, ID , partial-decs)
12: has-broadcast ← true
13: upon receipt of (DECS, ID , decs ′)
14: if (partial-decs.keys() = decs ′.keys()) ∧ (VerifyShare(ID , c, decs ′[c]) = 1 for all c ∈ decs ′.keys()) then
15: wait until has-broadcast = true
16: for each (c, σ) ∈ partial-decs ′ do
17: partial-decs[c]← partial-decs[c] ∪ {σ}
18: if |partial-decs[c]| = k for all c ∈ partial-decs.keys() then
19: for each c ∈ partial-decs.keys() do
20: plaintexts ← plaintexts ∪ {Dec(ID , c, partial-decs[c])}
21: return plaintexts
Protocol description. Each process begins with the plaintext m to propose to consensus. Pro-
cesses encrypt m under Enc, producing the ciphertext c (line 2). Processes propose their encrypted
value to an instance of AVCP identified by ID . Since valid() checks that VerifyEnc(ID ,m) = 1 for
a given tuple (m,σ), encs will thus contain well-formed encryptions (AVC-Validity) of processes’
proposals.
Now, AVCP guarantees that signatures, rather than the contents of messages, are unique. So,
it is conceivable that a process will mount a replay attack, which aims to disrupt an election by
mimicking the input of some process. Since values are encrypted under a common instantiation of
threshold encryption, it is desirable to prevent this attack. Consequently, we require that non-faulty
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processes prepend a sufficiently large sequence of random bits to their plaintext. For simplicity, we
assume that each sequence that a non-faulty proposes derives is unique. So, non-unique encrypted
messages are discarded (lines 4 and 5), resulting in the set unique-encs. At this point, threshold
decryption is performed with respect to each element of unique-encs (line 6). For each (encrypted)
value that a process decided, a decryption share is produced. Then, processes broadcast each share
and the corresponding ciphertext used to produce it.
Processes do not process shares that they have received from other processes until they have
broadcast their shares, ensuring termination for all non-faulty processes. In practice, processes can
process shares provided they delay termination until after they have broadcast. Upon receipt of
a (potential) set of shares, processes check that the ciphertexts received match theirs. Given this
holds, they check that all shares are well-formed. At this point, processes store these shares in
encs. Once a process has received k shares for every ciphertext in unique-encs, each ciphertext is
decrypted, and the resulting plaintexts are returned.
D.3 Analysis
We prove a number of properties hold:
Lemma D.1. ABE satisfies termination. That is, all non-faulty processes eventually complete
protocol execution.
Proof. At the protocol’s outset, all non-faulty processes produce a value c s.t. c← Enc(ID ,m) was
called for some m ∈ {0, 1} (line 2). Then, processes execute AVCP with respect to the identifier
ID , where every non-faulty process proposes a valid ciphertext c (line 3). On AARB-delivery of
each value, a process’ call to valid() will return true by encryption correctness, as it must be the case
VerifyEnc(ID , c) = 1 for such a c. By AVC-Termination, AVC-Validity and AVC-Agreement, all
non-faulty processes eventually terminate AVCP with the same set of values, each of which satisfies
valid(). By AVC-Agreement, all non-faulty processes will obtain the same set unique-encs (after
line 5). Then, all non-faulty processes will produce decryption shares for each value in unique-encs
via calls to ShareGen, which are guaranteed to be broadcast as no non-faulty process can terminate
until the condition at line 15 is fulfilled. On receipt of a set of decryption shares (line 13) (with
identical corresponding ciphertexts) from a non-faulty process, by share correctness each share σ
will satisfy VerifyShare(ID , c, σ) = 1 for the corresponding ciphertext c. Thus, a non-faulty process
will eventually receive k = t+ 1 valid decryption shares for each unique value that was decided by
AVCP. Thus, they can call Dec with respect to each set of shares (line 20) which by decryption
correctness will pass, and thus the process will return the corresponding plaintexts.
Comparable definitions to anonymous vector consensus (Section 4) regarding agreement, validity
and anonymity follow straightforwardly from the fact that AVCP satisfies AVC-Agreement, AVC-
Validity and AVC-Anonymity, respectively.
Lemma D.2. ABE satisfies public verifiability. That is, any third party can obtain the result of
the election after termination.
Proof. By termination and agreement, all non-faulty processes eventually agree on the same set of
plaintext values. Then, a third party can request these values from all processes. On receipt of
t + 1 identical sets of values, the third party can deduce that the set of values corresponds to the
election result.
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Lemma D.3. ABE satisfies weak privacy. That is, a value proposed by a non-faulty process is
only revealed after AVCP has terminated for a non-faulty process.
Proof. Each non-faulty process p proposes a value c s.t. c ← Enc(ID ,m) was invoked for some
m ∈ {0, 1}∗ (line 2). Encryption hiding implies that m can only be revealed if either p reveals m,
which p does not in the protocol, or if a valid call to Dec is made. By decryption security, Dec will
only return m if provided k = t+ 1 valid decryption shares. Now, no non-faulty process broadcasts
a decryption share until after it terminates AVCP. Thus, a coalition of t faulty processes cannot
decrypt m via Dec, which is the only conceivable way for them to obtain m in the model.
Lemma D.4. ABE satisfies eligibility. That is, only processes in P may propose a ballot that is
decided.
Proof. By assumption, non-faulty processes only process messages sent over regular channels from
processes in P . But, any party may anonymously broadcast a value v. AARBP satisfies AVC-
Signing. That is, all AARB-delivered messages are of the form (m,σ), where σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m).
By assumption on the interface of Sign, only a process in P may call Sign. By construction of AVCP,
only messages that are AARB-delivered are decided by non-faulty processes. Thus, no non-faulty
process will decide a value v in AVCP from any party outside of P .
Lemma D.5. ABE satisfies non-reusability. That is, at most one encrypted ballot signed by a
particular process can be decided in the election.
Proof. By construction of AVCP, only messages that are AARB-delivered are decided by non-faulty
processes. By AARB-Unicity, no non-faulty process will AARB-deliver more than one tuple (m,σ)
such that a process pi invoked σ ← Sign(i, ID ,m).
E Experiments
In this section, we present experimental results of our implementations of cryptographic and dis-
tributed protocols. To determine their influence in cost over our distributed protocols, we bench-
mark two cryptographic protocols which our distributed protocols rely on, namely Fujisaki’s trace-
able ring signature (TRS) scheme [29] and Shoup and Gennaro’s threshold encryption scheme [53].
With this information, we then benchmark and evaluate our three distributed protocols: Anony-
mous All-to-all Reliable Broadcast Protocol (AARBP), Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus
Protocol (AVCP), and our election scheme, Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE).
E.1 Cryptography
Benchmarks of standalone cryptographic constructions were performed on a laptop with an Intel i5-
7200U (quad-core) processor clocked at 3.1GHz and 8GB of memory. The operating system used
was Ubuntu 18.04. Each cryptosystem was implemented in golang. All cryptographic schemes
were implemented using Curve25519 [7]. To simulate a prime-order group we use the Ristretto
technique [1], derived from the Decaf approach [35], via go-ristretto1. All cryptographic operations
rely on constant-time arithmetic operations to prevent side-channel attacks [12]. Each data point
represents a minimum of 100 and a maximum of 10000 iterations.
1https://github.com/bwesterb/go-ristretto
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E.1.1 Ring signatures
To confirm that the implementation is competitive, we compare it to an implementation of Lui
et al.’s linkable ring signature scheme [40]. The particular implementation we compare to was
produced by EPFL’s DEDIS group as part of kyber2. We note that the ring signature schemes
naturally lend themselves towards parallelism. To this end, we provide an extension of our TRS
implementation that takes advantage of concurrency.
We compared the two major operations. Firstly, the Sign() operation (“Sign” in Section 2) is
that which forms a ring signature. Secondly, Verify() (“VerifySig” in Section 2) takes a ring signature
as input, and verifies the well-formedness of the signature, and (in implementation) outputs a tag
which is used for linking/tracing.
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Figure 1: Comparing TRS and LRS operations
Figure 1a represents the normalised speedup, as a percentage, afforded to the Sign() and Verify()
operations in the TRS scheme. We note that Figure 1a involves purely sequential implementations.
We vary n, the size of the ring. Performance of Sign() and Verify() in both schemes scales linearly
with respect to n.
Let TLRS be the time an operation (signing or verification) takes in the TRS implementation,
and similarly define TTRS . Then, normalised speedup is given by:
normalised speedup =
TLRS − TTRS
TTRS
Indeed, this value hovers above 70 percent for all values of n tested. In the LRS implementation,
the Sign() operation took between 7.5 and 230.4ms to execute (for values n = 10 and n = 310 re-
spectively). Sign() in the TRS implementation took between 4.3 and 132.0ms to execute. Similarly,
Verify() took between 7.7 and 230.3ms to execute in the LRS implementation, and took between
4.4 and 134.6ms to execute in the TRS implementation.
To understand the performance increase, we count cryptographic operations. We use the no-
tation presented in [58], adapted to represent elliptic curve operations. Let E denote the cost of
performing point multiplication, and M denote the number of operations of the form (aP + bQ),
where a, b are scalars, and P,Q are points. Then, in the LRS scheme, Sign() requires 2(n−1)M+3E
operations, and Verify() requires 2nM operations [58]. In the TRS scheme, Sign() requires the same
2https://godoc.org/github.com/dedis/kyber/sign/anon
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2(n−1)M and 3E operations, in addition to nM other operations. Similarly, the TRS Verify() call
requires 2nM + nM = 3nM operations. With the same elliptic curve implementation, we should
see a performance increase from an efficient LRS implementation, as the TRS scheme requires 1.5x
M operations by comparison to the LRS scheme. But, in the library we use for ECC, go-ristretto,
base point multiplication is 2.8x faster, point multiplication is 2.3x faster, and point addition
is 2.6x faster. Thus, we see an overall increase in performance in our TRS implementation by
comparison.
Recall that in AARBP (and thus AVCP), ring signature tracing is performed iteratively. Sup-
pose that some process has x correct ring signatures that they have verified at some point in time.
Then, upon receipt of another signature, they first execute Verify(), and then perform the Trace()
operation between the new signature and each of the x stored signatures. To model this behaviour,
we perform a benchmark where signatures are processed one-by-one with a ring of size n that
is varied from 20 to 100 in increments of 20. As the linkable ring signature scheme admits very
similar functionality, except it performs a linking operation, rather than a tracing operation, we
benchmark similarly.
Figure 1b compares the average time taken to perform the aforementioned procedure, between
a sequential implementation of the TRS scheme, the corresponding concurrent implementation
(utilising four cores), and the (sequential) LRS implementation. Now, the time taken to perform
Verify() is proportional to the size of the ring n. In addition, we perform more (n) Verify()
operations as we increase n. Consequently, execution time grows quadratically in Figure 1b for
each implementation. In addition to the previously outlined speedup, we roughly halve execution
time of TRS operations by exploiting concurrency in our implementation. With n = 100, our
concurrent implementation is 2.25x faster than our sequential implementation, and is 3.86x faster
than the sequential LRS implementation.
To perform Trace() between two signatures, O(n) comparisons are performed in a naive imple-
mentation, whereas a single comparison is need to link in the TRS scheme. In implementation, we
used a hash table, so each new signature required O(n) lookups in the TRS scheme, and one lookup
in the LRS scheme. As expected, we observe that the increased overhead of tracing is dominated
by the time taken performing Verify() operations, and so speedup does not appear to be affected.
E.1.2 Threshold encryption
Our arbitrary ballot voting scheme, ABE, presented in Appendix D, can be instantiated with Shoup
and Gennaro’s threshold encryption scheme [53]. To this end, we present results corresponding to
our implementation of their construction.
Operation Time to execute (ms)
Encryption 0.407
Encryption verification 0.358
Share decryption 0.247
Share verification 0.339
Table 2: Threshold encryption operations
Table 2 shows the performance of all operations in the threshold encryption scheme [53] as
executed by one process, bar decryption itself. As can be seen, all operations can be executed in a
reasonable amount of time (less than a millisecond). In our electronic voting protocol, each process
performs a single encryption operation, but may perform O(n) operations of the other forms over
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the protocol’s execution. Even when n is relatively large (> 100), we can expect to see acceptable
levels of performance.
Let P be a group of n processes. Then, the final operation, share combination, combines a
group of k valid decryption shares, where k is the threshold required to reconstruct the secret. In
our electronic voting protocols, for interoperability with our consensus algorithms, we set k = t+1,
where t is, at most, the largest value such that t < n3 .
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Figure 2: Time taken for k partial decryptions (shares) to be combined to decrypt a given message
Figure 2 represents the time taken to decrypt a message, varying k, the number of shares needed
to reconstruct the message in increments of 10. As some steps of the reconstruction process can be
performed concurrently, e.g. in the derivation of Lagrange coefficients [52], we provide an extension
that takes advantage of a multi-core processor. To this end, Figure 2 graphs the time taken
to perform share combination with both our sequential implementation, and the corresponding
concurrent implementation utilising two to four cores.
Indeed, producing Lagrange coefficients requires a quadratic amount of work (with respect to k),
and subsequently decrypting a message takes O(k) effort, which dominates execution time. Both the
quadratic and linear components of the share combination can be made concurrent. Consequently,
we roughly double our performance with two to four cores running. It is worth noting that the
effort required to spawn additional threads in the three and four core case does not translate to a
very noticeable improvement in performance for our values of k.
E.2 Distributed protocols
Benchmarks of distributed protocols were performed using Amazon EC2 instances. We refer to
each EC2 instance used as a node, corresponding to a process in protocol descriptions. For each
value of n (the number of nodes) chosen, we ran experiments with an equal number of nodes
from four regions: Oregon (us-west-2), Ohio (us-east-2), Singapore (ap-southeast-1) and Frankfurt
(eu-central-1). The type of instance chosen was c4.xlarge, which provide 7.5GiB of memory, and
4 vCPUs, i.e. 4 cores of an Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 processor. We performed between 50 and
60 iterations for each value of n and t benchmarked. We vary n incrementally, and vary t both
with respect to the maximum fault-tolerance (i.e. t = bn−13 c), and also fix t = 6 for values of
n = 20, 40, . . . As such, we evaluate the effect of varying both n and t. All networking code, and
the application logic, was written in Python (2.7). As we have implemented our cryptosystems
in golang, we call our libraries from Python using ctypes3. To simulate reliable channels, nodes
3https://docs.python.org/2/library/ctypes.html
34
communicate over TCP. Nodes begin timing once all connections have been established (i.e. all
handshakes have been performed).
E.2.1 Anonymous proposer vector consensus
Our protocol, Anonymous Proposer Vector Consensus Protocol (AVCP), was implemented on top
of the existing DBFT [20] codebase, as was the case with AARBP. With respect to optimisations,
we make use of the aforementioned hashing optimisation in both AARBP and RB-broadcast (which
are primitives in AVCP and DBFT respectively), but do not make use of the fast-path optimisation
described in Section 4.
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Figure 3a compares the performance of AARBP with that of AVCP. In general, convergence
time for AVCP is higher as we need at least three more message steps for a process to decide. Given
that the fast-path optimisation is used, requiring 1 additional message step over AARBP in the
good case, the difference in performance between AVCP and AARBP would indeed be smaller.
Comparing AVCP with t = max and t = 6, we see that when t = 6, convergence is slower.
Indeed, AVC-Validity states at least n− t values fulfilling valid() are included in a process’ vector
given that they decide. Consequently, as t is smaller, n − t is larger, and so nodes will process
and decide more values. Although ARB-delivery may be faster for some messages, nodes generally
have to perform more TRS verification/tracing operations. As nodes decide 1 in more instances
of binary consensus, messages of the form (MSG, 0, r, S = {s1, · · · }) are propagated where |S| is
generally larger, slowing down decision time primarily due to size of the message. We conjecture
that nodes having to ARB-deliver all values in S before processing such a message does not slow
down performance, as all nodes are non-faulty in our experiments.
Figure 3b compares the performance of DBFT as a vector consensus vector routine with AVCP.
Indeed, the difference in performance between AVCP and DBFT when n = 20 and n = 40 is
primarily due to AVCP’s 750ms timeout. As expected when scaling n, cryptographic operations
result in worse scaling characteristics for AVCP. As can be seen, DBFT performs relatively well.
However, DBFT does not leverage anonymous channels, nor relies on ring signatures, and so AVCP’s
comparatively slow performance was expected. It is reassuring that AVCP’s performance does not
differ by an order of magnitude from that of DBFT, given AVCP provides anonymity guarantees.
Overall, AVCP performs reasonably well. Interestingly, AVCP performs better when t is set
as the maximum possible value, and so is best used in practice when maximising fault tolerance.
Nevertheless, converging when n = 100 takes between 5 and 7 seconds, depending on t, which is
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practically reasonable.
E.2.2 Arbitrary ballot election
Arbitrary Ballot Election (ABE) essentially combines AVCP with a threshold encryption scheme.
To perform our benchmarks for the election scheme, we used pre-generated keying material for
threshold encryption. We use the scheme [53] benchmarked in the previous section. Our experiment
differs from experiments with AVCP in that ring signatures must also contain valid encryptions as
per the threshold encryption scheme, and because all processes perform threshold decryption with
respect to all decided ballots.
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Figure 4: Comparing the performance of AVCP and ABE
Figure 4 compares the performance of AVCP with ABE as described above. As can be seen,
there is some, but not a considerable amount, of overhead from introducing the election’s necessary
cryptographic machinery. The main factors here are an additional message step, additional message
verifications, and, requiring the most additional effort, performing threshold decryption.
As can be seen (and was explored in Section E.2.1), AVCP performance degrades when t is
non-optimal. Despite this, the election still takes longer to perform when t is increased. Consider
the case where (n, t) = (100, 33). As shown in Figure 2, combining k = t + 1 = 34 (valid) partial
decryptions together takes roughly 30ms. Since each run of the experiment decides on at least
n − t = 67 values, processes have to spend almost two seconds combining shares together. In
the best case, each process has to verify that (n − t)t = 2211 shares are well-formed, which takes
roughly 750ms. Thus, in addition to other cryptographic overhead, it is clear that increasing t
affects election performance.
Notwithstanding, the election protocol performs well for reasonable values of n. At n = 100,
the election roughly takes between 7.5 and 9 seconds to execute from start to finish. Given that
the method for establishing anonymous channels used by processes is sufficiently reliable, we can
expect to see comparable results in practice.
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